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Abstract: We study repayment incentives generated through social sanctions and under pure in-
dividual liability. In our model agents are heterogeneous, with differing degrees of risk aversion.
We consider a simple setting in which agents might strategically default from a loan program.
We remove the usual assumption of exogenous social penalties, and consider the endogenous
penalty of exclusion from an underlying social cooperation game, modeled here as social risk-
sharing. For some types of agents social risk-sharing can be sustained by the threat of exclusion
from this arrangement. These types have social capital and can be given a loan that bootstraps on
the risk-sharing game by using the threat of exclusion from social risk-sharing to deter strategic
default. We show that the use of such sanctions can only cover a fraction of types participating in
social risk sharing. Further, coverage is decreasing in loan duration. We then show that an indi-
vidual loan program augmented by a compulsory illiquid savings plan (such schemes are used by
the Grameen Bank) can deliver greater coverage, and can even cover types excluded from social
risk-sharing (i.e. types for whom social penalties are not available at all). Further, the coverage
of an individual loan program has the desirable property of increasing with loan size as well as
loan duration. Finally, we show that social cooperation enhances the performance of individual
loans. Thus fostering social cooperation is beneficial under individual liability loans even though
it has limited usefulness as a penalty under social enforcement of repayment. The results offer an
explanation for the Grameen Bank’s adoption of individual liability replacing group liability in its
loan programs since 2002.
KEYWORDS: Strategic default, social cooperation, social penalties, individual liability, loan cov-
erage, loan duration, loan size.
JEL CLASSIFICATION: O12
1 Introduction
A large body of literature analyzing collective lending programs in developing countries
often assumes that compliance is born of the threat of social penalties.(1) The analysis
typically assumes that an exogenous social penalty is available, and members of schemes
such as group loans can harness this effectively to deter strategic default. It follows
that group loans can foster repayment incentives even in the absence of useful collateral,
which causes loan programs based on individual liability to fail.
However, in the last few years many loan programs in developing countries have moved
away from group loans towards offering individual loans. The most prominent change
has been in the contracts offered by the Grameen Bank, which originated the idea of group
loans. Since 2002, the Grameen Bank has moved to “Grameen II” contracts, which are
purely individual liability loans with certain compulsory illiquid savings requirements.(2)
Other well known micro finance institutions such as Bolivia’s BancoSol have similarly
moved from group loans to individual loans across several loan categories.
In this paper, our first objective is to consider the effectiveness of social penalties in deter-
ring strategic default oncewe remove the assumption that they are exogenously available.
Social penalties themselves arise from the fact that agents are engaged in some long-term
cooperation amongst themselves supported by appropriate threats of exclusion from the
cooperative arrangement. Suppose now some agents are given a loan with strategic de-
fault penalized by exclusion from social cooperation.(3) The underlying social cooperation
is sustained by the threat of exclusion - and now the same threat is also used to support
the loan program. In other words, when a loan program is introduced, the social penalty
(1)See Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) for a survey. See also the discussion of this and related topics in
Armenda´riz de Aghion and Morduch (2005).
(2)See, for example, Dowla and Barua (2006) for a detailed exposition of the Grameen II programs.
(3)There is a question about who punishes an agent who defaults strategically on a loan. In a group lend-
ing program, it could be just the other group members who punish. Alternatively, some others closely
connected to the group members might also punish. The strongest punishment arises if all members of so-
ciety punish. Bloch, Genicot, and Ray (2008) study such punishments in the context of the social networks.
In this paper we assume the strongest punishments (i.e. all members of society punish a deviating agent) to
maximize the power of social penalties. If the punishments are any weaker, that would only strengthen our
results on the superiority of individual liability loans. As we discuss later in the introduction (in the part
headed “aspects of the model”) as well as in section 2, our modeling accommodates the strongest penalties
as part of an equilibrium.
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remains the same as that in the original social cooperation game. However, the deviation
payoff is higher because an agent who considers defaulting on the loan would simulta-
neously deviate from social cooperation (since he will be excluded from the latter in any
case after the loan default).
In other words, ceratin penalties (such as exclusion from social cooperation) sustain social
cooperation in a repeated game. When a loan program is introduced that relies on social
penalties, it piggybacks on the same penalties to ensure that agents have the incentive to
repay. Therefore a loan program that depends on social penalties increases the deviation
payoff, but the penalties remain the same. Agents for whom the incentive constraint in
the underlying game binds or is close to binding would, if given a loan, now have an
incentive to deviate from paying the underlying social transfers as well as repaying the
loan. Thus relying on social sanctions for repayment can dilute the effectiveness of the
sanctions themselves.
The paper presents a simple model to illustrate this phenomenon. We assume the simple
case of complete information, and consider the incentive for strategic default from a loan
program. To endogenize social sanctions, we assume that social capital is the result of an
underlying risk-sharing arrangement among agents with different degrees of risk aver-
sion. The approach is similar to that in Bloch, Genicot, and Ray (2007), who, in a different
context, study social capital as arising from a model mutual help. We then analyze the
performance of a loan programme that exploits social penalties to enforce repayment by
deterring strategic default.
We first consider a loan program that depends purely on social enforcement. We show
that the threat of exclusion from social risk-sharing fails to deter deviation by types (the
type of an agent is his degree of risk aversion) below a cutoff, which could be quite high.
Essentially, a loan program using social penalties does not add to penalties, but adds to
deviation benefits, creating greater incentive to deviate simultaneously from social risk-
sharing as well as the loan program. This reduces the fraction of types covered by the
loan program. Coverage is decreasing in loan duration, and the coverage of long duration
loans are also decreasing in loan size.
Under complete information, the types that would deviate are known, and therefore ex-
cluded from the loan program. Thus the only issue is the coverage of a loan - i.e. the frac-
tion of types who can be offered loans. Of course, under incomplete information on types
the outcome would be worse: then deviation would no longer be an out-of-equilibrium
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phenomenon, and there would be types who would, after receiving a loan, deviate from
both the loan program aswell as social cooperation. In other words, a loan program using
social sanctions would damage social cooperation itself.
Our second objective is to compare the repayment incentives arising from a social penalty
discussed above to those arising from a purely individual loan. We show that a simple in-
dividual loan scheme augmented by a mandatory savings plan can deliver both incentive
compatibility and budget balance while allowing greater coverage compared to schemes
using social sanctions. Indeed, we show that such an individual loan scheme can even
cover types excluded from social risk-sharing (i.e. types for whom social penalties are not
available at all). Moreover, unlike schemes using social sanctions, the coverage of an in-
dividual loan program increases with loan size as well as loan duration. Thus not only is
it possible to offer individual loans to a much larger fraction of types, it is also possible to
offer loans of greater size and duration without violating repayment incentives.
In general, offering individual loans to an agent can alter the agent’s incentive to partic-
ipate in social cooperation. However, we show that an incentive compatible individual
loan program does not harm social cooperation. Types with social insurance do not have
an incentive to deviate from the insurance arrangement under an incentive compatible
individual loan program.
Finally, we show that even though individual loans do not directly depend on social co-
operation, such cooperation is useful because it enhances the performance of individual
loans. Essentially, the incentive to deviate from an individual loan repayment program
weakens when the income stream is smoothed through social insurance. Thus fostering
social cooperation raises coverage of individual loans even though it has limited use-
fulness as a penalty under social enforcement of repayment. In his discussion of the
“Grameen II” model (which is based purely on individual lending) Yunus (2008) notes
that if a borrower cannot repay basic installments, “there is now no need for the bank
to trigger actions to mobilize the group and the center pressure on her...Group solidarity
is used for forward-looking joint-actions...rather than for the unpleasant task of putting
unfriendly pressure on a friend.” Our analysis shows how such benefits of social co-
operation might arise when the resulting social capital is not used as a threat to extract
repayments.
An interesting paper by Gine´ and Karlan (2009) study the results from a randomized
control trial by a Philippine bank. The bank removed group liability from randomly
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selected group-screened lending groups. After three years, the authors find no increase
in default as well as larger group sizes in the converted centers. Thus coverage increased,
but performance did not worsen. Our results offer an explanation for this observation.
More generally, our results provide an explanation for the movement away from group
liability to individual liability in micro-credit programs.
Aspects of the Model
Before discussing related literature, it is worth noting two aspects of the model. First,
consider the nature of social punishments. Since we want to test the limits of the power
of social sanctions, we ensure that social sanctions have maximum power. Our model
makes two assumptions to ensure maximum power of social sanctions. First, note that
the ability of other agents to punish an agent arises from the fact that agents engage in
a risk-sharing game. Therefore, the greater the benefit of an agent from risk sharing, the
greater the power of social sanctions (which takes away this benefit by excluding the
agent from future risk sharing) on that agent. To maximize the power of social enforce-
ment, we then assume complete risk-sharing. Second, we assume that any deviation is met
by full exclusion from risk sharing. In other words, all other members of society punish
an agent who defaults strategically. Formally, this is achieved by the simple device of
modeling a continuum of agents. Since each agent is of measure zero, others have no cost
of punishing an agent who strategically defaults, and therefore the strongest punishment
is possible in equilibrium. Thus in terms of modeling of loans under social penalties, we
simply study the repayment incentive of an agent who faces full exclusion from social
risk sharing under strategic default.(4) Further, note that if we relax either feature, that
would weaken social penalties, and would enhance the relative performance of individ-
ual loans. In other words, our results show the superiority of individual-incentive based
loans over social-penalty based loans even when the latter features the strongest possible
penalties. Weakening this penalty would obviously reinforce our results.
(4)Note that we do not need to specify any further features of a group loan arrangement that borrowing
agents are part of. Given a continuum of agents, whether a single agent participates in risk sharing or is
excluded is payoff irrelevant for any other agent, and therefore punishing is always incentive compatible.
Thus irrespective of which fraction of other agents punish a defaulter, we need not specify any further
reason for them to carry out the punishment. And to maximize the punishment, we assume that all other
members of society punish a defaulter.
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The second aspect worth noting is the assumption of complete information. Given com-
plete information, all types that cannot be made to repay (i.e. types that would potentially
default) under social penalties are excluded from a loan program to start with. In other
words, strategic default is an entirely out-of-equilibrium phenomenon. The only concern
therefore is coverage - i.e. what fraction of types can qualify for a loan. However, if peer
information were not complete and therefore screening were imperfect, there would be
types who secure a loan and subsequently default in equilibrium. Note that this would
happen even if social ties are strong (so that the risk-sharing is full and coverage of risk-
sharing is high).
Related Literature
Several papers have analyzed enforcement by peers where the peers can impose exoge-
nously given social sanctions on a defaulter. Besley and Coate (1995) show that group
lending creates incentive for strategic default. They show that such problems can be re-
solved if borrowers can impose high enough social sanctions on others. In the analysis
of cooperative design by Banerjee, Besley, and Guinnane (1994), monitoring a borrower
by a non-borrowing co-signer depends on a sanction available to the latter. Similarly, the
design of peer monitoring schemes in Armenda´riz de Aghion (1999) depends on the abil-
ity of peers to impose a social sanction on a defaulter. In the model of Roy Chowdhury
(2007), some borrowers are assumed to possess an amount of social capital that they stand
to lose in the event of default from a group loan. In these papers, the sanction that peers
can impose is exogenously given. In contrast, this paper considers social penalties aris-
ing from the threat of exclusion from a risk-sharing game, which is itself enforced by the
threat of exclusion. Such endogenous incentives give rise to very different conclusions
about the power of social sanctions.
In our model, social capital arises from a repeated game of risk sharing. Coate and Raval-
lion (1993) study risk sharing in a repeated gamewith two agents. Genicot and Ray (2003)
and Bloch et al. (2008) study risk sharing in groups and networks. Bloch et al. (2007) study
a model in which social capital arises from mutual help. As mentioned previously, while
the context is different, our paper follows a similar approach in modeling social capital as
arising endogenously through a simple risk-sharing game.
Our focus is on the nature and power of social penalties. Of course, group lending pro-
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grams have other features such as sequential financing and monitoring by the lender.
In a series of papers, Roy Chowdhury(2005; 2007) has investigated the role of such fea-
tures. Further, Jain and Mansuri (2003) has considered the role played by collection of
repayment through several small installments. It is worth noting that any incentive ef-
fects generated by these features have little to do with group lending - they could easily
feature under individual liability as well. Indeed, Armenda´riz de Aghion and Morduch
(2000) offer evidence of the success of individual loans that use progressive/dynamic in-
centives, frequent repayments, and nontraditional collateral to guarantee a loan. Using
data from Eastern Europe and Russia, they demonstrate that individual loans can gener-
ate repayment rates greater than 90 percent (and above 95 percent in Russia).
Finally, other papers have compared group and individual loans based on entirely dif-
ferent considerations. Conning (2005) shows that delegating the task of monitoring to
other borrowers–who must also expend effort on their own projects–has an incentive di-
versification effect, which can make it attractive for the lender to delegate monitoring to
borrowers. In this case, peers are given formal incentives to monitor by the lender. Here
we consider endogenous sanctions arising from social interactions rather than peer en-
forcement when peers are formally contracted agents of the lender. Madajewicz (2005)
shows that a group loan may yield a lower welfare compared to an individual loan for
the wealthier among credit-constrained borrowers. In an environment with risk averse
borrowers, joint liability has the usual advantage from peer monitoring, but there is also
a second effect: choice of risky project by one borrower imposes a negative externality on
others, so that the optimal choice of each is riskier. The paper shows that the second effect
can dominate for higher levels of wealth, so that wealthier borrowers can get larger loans
under individual liability. In this paper, on the other hand, the difference between social
and individual enforcement arise from the fact that the former must exploit incentives
that arise endogenously through social cooperation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section sets up the model. Sec-
tion 3 clarifies the underlying risk-sharing arrangement, which generates the scope for
social penalties. Section 4 then analyzes the performance of a loan program that har-
nesses such penalties. Section 5 sets up and analyzes a simple individual loan program
with forced saving. Finally, section 7 concludes by comparing the results from the two
previous sections. Proofs not in the body of the paper are collected in the appendix.
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2 The Model
There is a continuum of agents. Each agent draws a type ρ from some distribution F on
[0, ρ]. The utility function of an agent with wealth x and type ρ is
(1) u(x ; ρ) =
1− e−xρ
ρ
.
The type ρ of an agent is the degree of absolute risk aversion of the agent. Note that as
ρ → 0, u(x ; ρ) → x, the risk neutral utility function. We assume full information on types.
There are an infinite number of periods. In each period the wealth of an individual is 1
with probability p and 0 with probability (1− p). Agents have no savings technology.(5)
Agents have a common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1).
An investment opportunity lasting T periods arises for some agents. For simplicity, we
assume that a project needs an indivisible investment of size M each period and the gross
return each period is M(1+ R) where R > 0. Note that we simply study the incentive
for strategic default which arises after any return is realized - and therefore assume the
simplest possible investment opportunity.
An external lender funds the project with a loan for T periods. In each period, the external
lender offers a loan of M. For simplicity, we assume that the lender can obtain funds at a
zero rate of interest and lends on a zero-profit basis. This implies that the lender requires
a repayment of M for each loan. We also assume that the lender has access to a savings
technology.(6)
We do the accounting as follows. The first loan made at time 0 and the first repayment
date is t = 1, which is also when the second loan is given. Time t = 2 is then the date
for the second repayment and third loan. Thus in general, the k-th loan is made in period
k− 1 and the repayment is due in period k. Therefore a T period loan consists of T loan
dates t = 0, . . . , T− 1, and T repayment dates t = 1, . . . , T.
(5)If agents could save and thereby smooth own consumption to an extent, that would only reduce the
value of social insurance, thereby reducing the power of social sanctions.
(6)This is made use of under individual loans - see section 5 for details.
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3 Risk Sharing and Social Capital
In this section we specify formally the social risk-sharing arrangement that forms the
basis for social sanctions in our model. Types participating in social risk sharing are said
to possess social capital. The extent of social capital for an agent of course depends on
the agent’s type - social capital is higher for higher values of ρ. As we show later, some
types participating in social risk sharing can be given a loan with repayment incentives
sustained by a social sanction which consists of excluding an agent from risk sharing
(thus taking away the social capital of the agent).
As shown below, reducing risk sharing simply reduces the ability of social incentives
to provide repayment incentives in a loan program. To maximize the power of social
sanctions we assume that the risk sharing is full.
Recall that in each period an agent has an income of 1 or 0. Sharing risk consists of agents
with income 1 contributing some share of this to a social pot which is then distributed
equally across agents. Suppose agents share a fraction α of their income. In other words,
all agents with an income of 1 pays α into a common pot, which is then equally distributed
across agents. In any period, the payoff from conforming to this arrangement is U(α) =
pu((1− α)+pα)+ (1−p)u(pα). Therefore the total repeated game payoff from conform-
ing is given byU(α)+ δU(α)+ δ2U(α)+ . . . = U(α)/(1− δ). Deviation has an immediate
gain only if the agent has an income of 1, and in future the agent loses the social insurance.
Therefore the deviation payoff is UD = u(1 ; ρ) + δ/(1− δ)(pu(1 ; ρ) + (1− p)u(0 ; ρ)).
Note that the deviation payoff does not depend on α, while the payoff from conforming
given by U(α) is maximized when risk sharing is full, i.e. α = 1. Clearly, full risk sharing
maximizes the net benefit of social risk sharing. In what follows, we assume that the
underlying social risk sharing game is characterized by full risk sharing. This maximizes
the benefit of cooperating, which therefore maximizes the power of social penalties.
Since risk sharing is full, by conforming, any agent receives a constant payoff p per pe-
riod. Therefore the payoff from conforming is given by u(p ; ρ)/(1 − δ). Deviation has
an immediate gain only if the agent has an income of 1, in which case the immediate
gain from deviation is given by G = u(1 ; ρ)− u(p ; ρ). Following a deviation, the agent
loses social insurance in future. Therefore, starting next period, the loss per period is
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L = u(p ; ρ)− (pu(1 ; ρ) + (1− p)u(0 ; ρ)). Let ρmin be the solution to
(2) G =
δ
(1− δ)
L.
The following result shows that the solution is unique, i.e. there is a unique type ρmin
that is indifferent between deviating and conforming. Types below this cutoff prefer to
deviate while types above conform. Clearly, this cutoff is decreasing in δ.
Proposition 1. There is a unique type ρmin > 0 such that the subset [ρmin, ρ] of types cooperate
and share risk. Types below ρmin are excluded from the risk sharing scheme. The type ρmin is
decreasing in δ.
Figure 1 in the next section shows the cutoff ρmin in an example. Since only types in the
interval [ρmin, ρ] participate in risk sharing, any loan program based on social sanctions
can cover at most these types. However, as we show next, coveragemight be considerably
lower.
4 Loan Program Under Social Sanctions
A loan program dependent on social sanctions works as follows. As explained in sec-
tion 2, an external lender lends M at each loan date to each agent with an investment
opportunity, and requires a repayment of M at each repayment date. The social sanction
is then as follows. If at any t ∈ {1, . . . , T} a borrowing agent fails to make a repayment,
the agent is excluded from social risk-sharing.
A loan program (M, T) is said to be sustainable under social sanctions for any type ρ ∈
[0, ρ] if the threat of exclusion form social risk-sharing is sufficient to deter this type from
not making the required repayment at all dates t ∈ {1, . . . , T}.
Three aspects of the scheme are worth emphasizing.
• As mentioned in the introduction, under complete information, loans are only of-
fered to agents with types for which the loan is sustainable. Types that would poten-
tially deviate (from the loan program as well as social risk sharing) after receiving a
loan are precluded from the loan program. Therefore deviations are an entirely out-
of-equilibrium phenomenon. The only issue is the coverage, i.e. for what fraction of
types can a loan program be made incentive compatible.
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• Next, note that each agent is measure zero, and therefore other agents suffer no loss
of utility from excluding an agent from social cooperation. In other words, we need
no further incentive for other agents to punish a deviator: such punishments are
already compatible with an equilibrium. Since other agents are indifferent between
punishing and not punishing a deviator, we are simply selecting the equilibrium in
which such punishments take place. It is worth reiterating that this modeling de-
vice strengthens the power of social sanctions. If agents were non-atomistic so that
exclusion of an agent from risk-sharing would reduce the utility of other agents, so-
cial sanctions would be less effective, as others would require incentives to penalize
a deviator.
• We want to isolate the incentive effects arising purely from social sanctions. To
this end, it is assumed that even after a default at t < T, the external lender still
makes loans as scheduled at future dates up to T. We will later study the impact of
exclusion from future loans as a punishment under individual liability loans.
In our model, a default is detected with certainty, implying that this distinction
arises only as a modeling device. However, such an arrangement can occur nat-
urally in equilibrium in a richer model. Suppose instead of a certain return R, a
project returns Rwith probability q ∈ (0, 1) and 0 with the residual probability. Sup-
pose that peers know the realized state while an external lender must incur some
positive cost c > 0 to learn the realized state. A loan under social sanction then
uses no monitoring by the lender and relies purely on social enforcement. Thus an
agent who defaults strategically at period t < T expects to be excluded from social
risk-sharing but expects to receive loans in future as normal. An individual loan, in
contrast, verifies the state at every date and penalizes strategic defaulters directly
(through denial of future loans and transfers). For small values of c, this setting
does not change any result qualitatively.
The next section derives the set of types who would deviate under a loan program that
makes use of social sanctions to enforce repayment. Such types would then be excluded
from the loan program. Section 4.2 then derives the main results for such loans.
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4.1 Deviation Incentives
Under a T period loan, a borrower gets T opportunities to deviate. In this section we de-
termine the set of types who would potentially deviate, and therefore cannot be covered
by a loan program using social penalties.
The plan of the section is as follows. First, we derive the total loss from deviation and
a crucial property of this loss. Next, we show that there is a unique cutoff type in each
period such that types below the cutoff deviate and those above conform. Finally, propo-
sition 2 presents the main result showing that the highest incentive to deviate occurs in
the earliest repayment period, and therefore the first period’s cutoff type is the global
separator between deviating and conforming types.
Consider a T > 1 period loan program. For any 1 6 t 6 T, the payoff in period t from
conforming is given by
Vt =
T−t∑
k=0
δku(p+ MR ; ρ) +
δT−t+1
1− δ
u(p ; ρ).
Note that a type deviating from loan payment in any period t 6 T also deviates from
loan payment in every subsequent period until T. To see this, note that in any subsequent
period, the type is not included in social cooperation - and therefore there is noting to be
gained from conforming, but the extra payoff from deviation is lost.(7)
Using this, the payoff from deviating in period t is given by:
VDt = u(1+M+ MR ; ρ) +
T−t∑
k=1
δk
pu(1+ M+MR ; ρ) + (1− p)u(M + MR ; ρ)
+
δT−t+1
1− δ
pu(1 ; ρ) + (1− p)u(0 ; ρ).
Let
G(X ; ρ) ≡ u(1+ X+ XR ; ρ)− u(p+ XR ; ρ),(3)
L(X ; ρ) ≡ u(p+ XR ; ρ)−
pu(1+ X + XR ; ρ) + (1− p)u(X + XR ; ρ).(4)
(7)Formally, after deviation at t > 0, in any subsequent period the payoff from conforming is either
u(1+MR ; ρ) (with probability p) or u(MR ; ρ) (with probability (1− p)). The payoff from deviating in any
such period, on the other hand, is u(1+M+MR ; ρ) in the first case and u(M+MR ; ρ) in the second case.
Clearly, deviating dominates conforming.
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If an agent of type ρ deviates in any period t 6 T, the immediate gain is G(M ; ρ). In every
subsequent period up to period T, the agent incurs a loss of L(M ; ρ). After period T, the
loss in each period is u(p ; ρ)− (pu(1 ; ρ) + (1− p)u(0 ; ρ)), which is simply L(0 ; ρ). Thus
the total loss from deviation in any period t 6 T is
TL t(M ; ρ) =
T−t∑
k=1
δkL(M ; ρ) +
δT−t+1
1− δ
L(0 ; ρ)
=
δ
1− δ
[
(1− δT−t)L(M ; ρ) + δT−tL(0 ; ρ)
]
.(5)
The next result establishes a crucial property of the total loss from deviation: this loss is
increasing in time. In other words, the loss from deviation is lower for earlier deviations.
Lemma 1. For any t 6 T, TL t−1(M ; ρ) < TL t(M ; ρ).
This then suggests–as explained below–that it is the incentives at date 1 that determines
overall incentive compatibility. However, before we can establish this claim, we need to
show that there is a well-defined participation threshold type that separates deviators
and conformers in each period. We show this through Lemmas 2 and 3 below.
Note that TL t(M ; ρ)−G(M ; ρ) = Vt−VDt . Let ρ̂t be the type that is indifferent between
conforming and deviating. It is the type for which gain and loss are exactly equal. Thus
ρ̂t is given by the solution to Vt = VDt , which is the same as G(M ; ρ) = TL t(M ; ρ). Using
equations (3) and (4), this can be written as follows:
ρ̂t is given by the solution to
(6)
δ
1− δ
[
(1− δT−t)
L(M ; ρ)
G(M ; ρ)
+ δT−t
L(0 ; ρ)
G(M ; ρ)
]
= 1.
We now establish that this cutoff type exists and is unique. First, we need the following
result:
Lemma 2.
L(0 ;ρ)
G(M ;ρ)
is increasing in ρ.
The following result now shows that there exists a unique cutoff ρ̂t which is indifferent
between deviating and conforming in any period t. Only types above this threshold con-
form, and types below are excluded from the loan program.
Lemma 3. For any t ∈ {0, . . . , T}, and for any M, R > 0 there is a unique solution ρ̂t to
equation (6). Further, Vt(T ; ρ) ≷ VDt (T ; ρ) according as ρ ≷ ρ̂t.
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Let ρ∗(T) denote the repayment threshold under a T period loan program. This is given
by
ρ∗(T) ≡ max{ρ̂1, . . . , ρ̂T}.
This cutoff separates the types below who deviate in some period t 6 T, and therefore
cannot be included in the loan program, from the types above who conform and can be
covered by the loan. The result below now shows that the relevant threshold is the initial
one. In other words, to determine the types to be excluded from the loan programme, we
only need to consider types who would deviate in the very first period.
Proposition 2. (Participation Threshold) For a loan program lasting T periods, the incentive
to deviate is strongest in the initial period of the loan and therefore the participation threshold
ρ∗(T) is given by
(7) ρ∗(T) = ρ̂1,
where ρ̂1 is the solution to equation (6) for t = 1.
Proof: Consider the incentive of type ρ̂t in period t− 1. The gain from deviation in period
t− 1 for this type is the same as that in period t, and given by G(M ; ρ) (which is given by
equation (3)). But from Lemma 1 the total loss at t− 1 is lower. Therefore it is clear that
type ρ̂t is among the types that strictly prefer to deviate in period t− 1. In other words,
ρ̂t−1 > ρ̂t for any t 6 T. This proves that ρ̂1 = max{ρ̂1, . . . , ρ̂T}.‖
4.2 Project Size, Loan Duration and Loan Coverage
This section presents the main results on the coverage of a loan program using social
sanctions to enforce repayment. We first show that the coverage of such a loan program
(i.e. the fraction of types for whom the loan program is incentive compatible) decreases
in loan duration.
Proposition 3. (Loan Duration and Coverage) ρ∗(T + 1) > ρ∗(T), which implies that loan
coverage decreases in the duration of the loan program.
Figure 1 below shows an example of coverage of a loan program. Recall that the loan
cutoff ρ∗ is given by the solution to equation (6) for t = 1. Further, from equation (2),
the social insurance cutoff ρmin is given by
δ
1−δ
L
G = 1 which is the same as equation (6)
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for M = 0. The figure plots the left hand side of equation (6) for M = 0 and M > 0.
The points where these cross 1 gives ρmin and ρ
∗ respectively. Note that the coverage of
the loan program shrinks significantly compared to the coverage of the underlying social
risk-sharing arrangement.
1.02 5.2
-2
-1
1
2
0
ρ ρ
min
*
pure 
risk-sharing
(M=0)
under loan
program
M=1, R=0.2,T=10
ρ
Figure 1: The coverage of social risk-sharing and that of a loan program under social enforcement.
Recall that the cutoff under any loan program is given by equation (6) for t = 1. The figure plots
the left hand side of this equation for both M = 0 (pure risk sharing) and under the loan program
M = 1, R = 0.2, and T = 10. Further, p = 0.5 and δ = 0.75. Type above the cutoff ρmin = 1.02
participate in social risk-sharing, but the loan program is incentive compatible only for types above
ρ∗ = 5.2.
The next result considers the impact on coverage of varying loan size M. In general, it
is not possible to sign the derivative of ρ∗(T) with respect to M. This is because the first
ratio in the left hand side of equation (6) is decreasing in M, while the second ratio is
either increasing in M or decreasing first and then increasing in M. The overall effect is
therefore ambiguous. However, as the result below shows, we can sign the derivative in
the special case of a long-duration loan. If loan duration is long enough, we know from
the previous result that coverage is already low. In this case, coverage decreases even
further as the loan size M increases.
Proposition 4. (Loan Size and Coverage) For any loan program (M, T). For values of T
large enough (loan duration long enough), the coverage of the loan is decreasing in loan size M.
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5 Individual Loan Program
In an individual loan program, a defaulter is simply denied future loans, and any amount
accumulated in a compulsory savings account can be used towards repayment of out-
standing amounts. We now discuss such an individual loan program and show that in
contrast with loans supported by social sanctions, it can cover all types - i.e. even cover
types who do not participate in social risk sharing. Further, even when an individual loan
program has less than full coverage, the coverage increases unambiguously with loan size
as well as loan duration.
Finally, we show that even though an individual loan does not make use of social sanc-
tions, it can indirectly benefit from stronger underlying risk-sharing: the incentive com-
patibility condition for types who do not participate in social risk sharing (types with-
out social capital) is stricter than that for types who do participate in social risk sharing.
Therefore participation in social risk sharing makes it easier to cover a type by an indi-
vidual loan program.
5.1 The Loan Mechanism
As noted before, since 2002 the Grameen Bank offers purely individual loans. These
“Grameen II” loans have a an associated special savings account in which a borrower
must make compulsory deposits (of a certain percentage of the loan value). These sav-
ings have restricted liquidity, and accumulated amounts can be used towards repayment
of outstanding amounts at the end of the loan.(8)
We construct a similar loan program, and define an individual loan as a finite sequence of
loans with individual liability augmented by a compulsory illiquid savings account held
with the lender. As assumed at the outset, agents do not have any savings technology,
but the lender has a savings technology. The lender can therefore place any repayment
amounts into a savings fund and hold it on behalf of an agent.
As before, loans of size M are made across T periods t = 0, . . . , T − 1. A loan given in
period t requires repayment in period t+ 1. This implies that there are T corresponding
repayment dates t = 1, . . . , T. We assume that the loan program is designed so that the
(8)See, for example, Dowla and Barua (2006), chapter 3.
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lender makes a zero profit. Therefore for a loan of size M made at date t, the required
repayment at t+ 1 is also M.
Finally, the loan program also includes a compulsory savings clause. This requires a
borrowing agent to deposit an amount rM each period, r ∈ (0, 1), into a savings account
held with the lender. The borrower has no withdrawal privileges while the loan program
is ongoing. If the borrower does not repay in any period t 6 T, the lender can seize the
amount available in the account. At the end of the loan program, when all repayments
are made, the borrower is given full access to the accumulated account. Let S denote the
amount returned to the borrower at the end of the loan program. This is derived from
budget balance below.
The purpose of the compulsory savings account is obvious. This serves as collateral. In
the absence of some such provision, borrowers would definitely default in the last pe-
riod. With the savings clause, they stand to lose the accumulated savings if they default.
Therefore, incentive to repay can be sustained by accumulating the right amount of sav-
ings. However, the fact that such deposits must be made itself affects repayment incen-
tives in any period before the last period. We derive below the condition under which the
mechanism succeeds in sustaining repayments for all types of agents.
Analyzing repayment incentives We now analyze the repayment incentives of agents
under an individual loan program. This is organized as follows. First, in section 5.2,
we consider the repayment incentives for types with social capital (i.e. types ρ > ρmin
- these are the types that participate in social risk sharing). Second, in section 5.3, we
consider the repayment incentives for types who do not participate in social risk sharing
(types below ρmin). One immediate question is whether such a division is justified - as an
individual loan could alter the incentive of a type to participate in social risk sharing. If
this were the case, ρmin would not be a meaningful separation point any longer. However,
once we derive the incentive compatibility condition below for types who participate in
risk sharing, we show (proposition 8 below) that an incentive compatible individual loan
program does not alter the incentive to participate in social risk sharing, justifying the
separation.
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5.2 Repayment Incentives for Types with Social Capital
5.2.1 Deriving the incentive compatibility condition
Recall that a loan of size M is given each period, and gross return for the borrower each
period is M(1+ R) where R > 0. The lender requires a repayment of M + Mr at each
repayment date, where Mr is placed in a savings account that the borrower cannot with-
draw from. At the end of the loan program, the lender returns S to the borrower.
The expected utility from repaying the loan in each period starting from any period t 6 T
is given by
Wt = u(M(R − r) + p ; ρ) + . . .+ δ
T−t−1u(M(R − r) + p ; ρ)
+ δT−tu(M(R − r) + p+ S ; ρ) +
δT−t+1
1− δ
u(p ; ρ)
=
1− δT−t
1− δ
u(M(R − r) + p ; ρ) + δT−tu(M(R − r) + p+ S ; ρ) +
δT−t+1
1− δ
u(p ; ρ).
The expected payoff from defaulting in period t 6 T is
WDt = u(M +MR+ p ; ρ) +
δ
1− δ
u(p ; ρ).
Now, for the last period,
WT −W
D
T = u(M(R − r) + p+ S ; ρ)− u(M +MR+ p ; ρ).
Since u(·; ·) is increasing in the first argument, incentive compatibility requires M(R −
r) + p+ S > M+MR+ p, implying S > M+Mr.
Given that repayment is incentive compatible, the budget balance condition is
(8) S = TMr.
Therefore incentive compatibility requires that (T − 1)Mr > M, which says that the net
transfer in the last period must be at least M. Since δ < 1, it is better for the agents to
receive income earlier rather than later. Therefore the optimal arrangement is to set r so
that (T − 1)Mr = M, i.e.
(9) S∗ = M+ Mr.
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Now, using the value of u(·; ·) from equation (1), and S∗ from above,
Wt −W
D
t =
e −(p+M(1+R))ρ
ρ
1− δT−t
1− δ
(
1− δ + δe M(1+R)ρ − e M(1+r)ρ
)
Therefore the incentive compatibility condition for any ρ is independent of t and is given
by
(10) 1− δ + δe M(1+R)ρ − e M(1+r)ρ > 0.
This proves the following result.
Proposition 5. Consider a type ρ ∈ [ρmin, ρ], and a budget balanced individual loan program
(M, R, T). The following condition is necessary and sufficient for the loan program to be incentive
compatible for type ρ: condition (10) holds for some r > 1
T − 1
.
Note that the incentive compatibility constraint (10) implies a maximum value of r for
any given values of other parameters. So long as this maximum value exceeds 1/(T − 1),
we can find r such that the conditions stated in the result above are satisfied. Therefore
we can write the incentive compatibility condition more compactly as the following:
Corollary 1. A project (M, R, T) can be supported by an incentive compatible and budget bal-
anced individual lending program for a type ρ > ρmin if and only if r(ρ) >
1
T− 1
, where
(11) r(ρ) =
ln
[
1− δ + δe M(1+R)ρ
]
ρM
− 1.
5.2.2 Covering all types with social capital
The next result shows that r(ρ) is increasing in ρ and M. This then gives us a sufficient
condition for all types under social risk-sharing to be covered by an individual loan pro-
gram.
Lemma 4. r(ρ) is strictly increasing in ρ and M.
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The result above proves that if r(ρ) > 1/(T − 1) for ρ = ρ̂, it is also met for all ρ > ρ̂.
Therefore an individual loan program can cover all types ρ > ρmin so long as the condition
holds for ρ = ρmin. A sufficient condition for this is that the condition holds at ρ = 0.
Now, limρ→0 r(ρ) = δ(1+ R)− 1. This proves the following result.
Proposition 6. Consider any project (M, R) with M > 0 and R > 0. The condition
δ(1+ R)− 1 > 1
T− 1
is sufficient for this project to be supported for all types ρ ∈ [ρmin, ρ] by an incentive compatible
and budget balanced individual loan program.
Figures 2 and 3 plot the function r(ρ) for different parameter values under which all types
with social capital (i.e. all types above ρmin) are covered by an individual loan program.
5.2.3 Comparative statics of coverage
Finally, let us consider the case of r(ρmin) < 1/(T − 1). In this case, there is scope for the
coverage to change with loan size and duration, and we show that the coverage increases
in both size and duration.
Now, in this casewe have r(ρ) > 1/(T− 1) only for types exceeding some cutoff ρ̂ > ρmin,
where the cutoff ρ̂ is the solution for ρ to(9)
(12) r(ρ) =
1
T− 1
.
Whenever ρ̂ < ρ, we can support a loan program for types (ρ̂, ρ]. The following result
establishes that the loan coverage increases in loan size as well as loan duration.
Proposition 7. ρ̂ is decreasing in both M and T.
Proof: We have
∂ρ̂
∂M
= −
∂r(ρ,δ,M)
∂M
∂r(ρ,δ,M)
∂ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ρ=ρ̂
. From Lemma 4, the derivatives in the numerator
and the denominator are both positive, and therefore
∂ρ̂
∂M < 0. Finally, since r(ρ) is in-
creasing in ρ, and right hand side of equation (12) is decreasing in T, ρ̂ is also decreasing
in T.‖
(9)Formally, for any δ < 1/(1+ R), ∃ ρ̂ > 0 such that ∀ρ > ρ̂, r(ρ) > 1/(T− 1). This is because there is a
unique solution ρ̂ to r(ρ) = 1T−1 . Since r(ρ) is strictly increasing in ρ (Lemma 4), the result follows.
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The previous section showed that under social-incentive-based lending, the loan cover-
age decreases in duration T, and the coverage of long-duration loans decreases in loan size
M as well. In cases other than long-duration loans, the effect of loan size on coverage is
ambiguous. The result above shows that, in contrast, under individual lending, a higher
project sizeM increases coverage unambiguously, and coverage also increases in the length
T of the program.
5.2.4 Individual loans and social cooperation incentives
We have considered above the repayment incentives of types with social capital. To com-
plete the analysis, we also need to show that types with social capital remain so even
when they receive individual liability loans. In other words, we need to show that types
with social insurance do not have an incentive to deviate from the insurance arrangement
under an incentive compatible individual loan program. The following result establishes
this.
Proposition 8. An incentive compatible individual loan program does not alter social cooperation
in risk sharing.
Next, we consider the repayment incentive for types who do not participate in social risk-
sharing. These types therefore do not have any social capital and cannot be covered at
all by a loan program that depends on social sanctions for enforcement of repayment.
However, as we show below, an individual lending program can cover these types as
well.
20
5.3 Repayment Incentives for Types without Social Capital
Social incentives are of course unavailable for types who do not participate in social risk-
sharing. Here we show that individual loans can cover these types as well, but repayment
requires satisfying a stricter condition than that for types with social capital. This also
proves that social capital is helpful in supporting individual loans.
First, we establish the stricter incentive compatibility condition in section 5.3.1 below. We
then show, in section 5.3.2, that whenever some (but not all) types without social capital
are covered by an individual loan program, coverage is increasing in both loan size and
loan duration.
5.3.1 The incentive compatibility condition and comparison with the condition under social
capital
The result below establishes the incentive compatibility condition for types not covered
by social insurance.
Proposition 9. Consider a type ρ ∈ (0, ρmin), and an individual loan program (M, T). The
following condition is necessary and sufficient for the loan program to be incentive compatible for
type ρ:
(13) δ
(
eM(1+R)ρ − 1
)
(p+ (1− p)e ρ)− e ρ
(
eM(1+r)ρ − 1
)
> 0
for some r > 1
T − 1
.
The proof proceeds through the following result, which is also of interest on its own. The
result shows that the incentive compatibility condition is stricter for types without social
capital compared to types with social capital.
Lemma 5. (Stricter incentive compatibility condition for types without social capital) If
condition (13) holds, this implies condition (10) holds as well, but the reverse is not true. In other
words, the incentive compatibility condition for an individual loan program is stricter for types
without social capital.
Proof: Let φ(p) ≡ δ
(
eM(1+R)ρ − 1
)
(p+ (1− p)e ρ) − e ρ
(
eM(1+r)ρ − 1
)
. This is simply
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the expression on the left hand side of condition (13). Note that
φ(0) = e ρ
(
1− δ + δe M(1+R)ρ − e M(1+r)ρ
)
.
Thus φ(0) > 0 is the same as condition (10). Now, φ′(p) = −δ(e ρ − 1)(eM(1+R)ρ − 1) < 0.
Therefore φ(p) > 0 implies φ(0) > 0, but φ(0) > 0 does not imply φ(p) > 0. This proves
that the incentive compatibility condition for an individual loan program is stricter for
types without social capital.‖
Let us now outline the proof of Proposition 9. The formal proof is in the appendix. First,
note that for an agent who is not socially insured, income is either 0 or 1. It is then easy to
see that the deviation gain is highest if the income is 0 - the gain in utility from retaining
the entire return of M(1+ R) (rather than repaying M(1+ r) and retaining M(R − r)) is
the highest in this case. Incentive compatibility then requires this gain to be lower than
the future loss at every t < T. As before, the transfers at T ensure that repayment is
incentive compatible at T.
Now, if we consider the incentive compatibility condition at t = T − 1, we get condi-
tion (13). This establishes the necessity of the condition. This condition would also be
sufficient if the loss from deviation is higher for earlier deviations (i.e. for deviations at
t < T − 1). In this case, clearly, if incentive compatibility holds at T − 1, it also holds for
all earlier periods. It turns out that loss from earlier deviations is higher if and only if con-
dition (10) holds. But Lemma 5 above shows that condition (13) implies condition (10).
Therefore condition (13) is also sufficient for incentive compatibility.
As in the case of types with social capital, the incentive compatibility condition can be
written more compactly as follows. A project (M, R, T) can be supported by an incentive
compatible individual lending program for a type ρ ∈ (0, ρmin] if and only if
(14) r˜(ρ) > 1
T− 1
,
where
(15)
r˜(ρ) =
1
M ρ
ln
[
(1− p)δe (1+M(1+R))ρ +
(
1− (1− p)δ
)
e ρ + pδ
(
e M(1+R)ρ − 1
)]
−
M+ 1
M
.
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5.3.2 Comparative statics of coverage
Note that the constraint obviously becomes more lax as T increases (so that the right hand
side decreases). The next Lemma shows that r˜(ρ) is increasing in M.
Lemma 6. r˜(ρ) is increasing in M.
If the inequality r˜(ρ) > 1T−1 is satisfied for all ρ ∈ (0, ρmin], clearly further increase in M
or T has no impact. Also, if the inequality is satisfied for no ρ ∈ (0, ρmin], an increase in M
or T would reduce the extent by which the right hand side exceeds the left hand side,but
the constraint still might not hold for any ρ ∈ (0, ρmin]. However, suppose the inequality
is satisfied for at least some values of ρ ∈ (0, ρmin]. As T increases, or M increases, the
inequality is now satisfied for further values of ρ ∈ (0, ρmin]. This shows that, in the
appropriate case, coverage is increasing in both loan size and loan duration.
5.4 Some Examples
Let us consider some examples of coverage under an individual lending program. From
sections 5.2 and 5.3, we know that the incentive compatibility condition for a type ρ is
given by r(ρ) > 1T−1 for ρ > ρmin, i.e. types with social capital,r˜(ρ) > 1T−1 for ρ < ρmin, i.e. types without social capital,
where r(ρ) is given by equation 11, and r˜(ρ) is given by equation (15).
Figures 2 and ?? below show the functions r(ρ) and r˜(ρ) with ρ on the horizontal axis,
and also show the line 1/(T− 1). For any type ρ > ρmin for which the curve r(ρ) is above
the line the line 1/(T − 1) can be covered by an individual lending program. Similarly,
for any type ρ < ρmin for which the curve r˜(ρ) is above the line the line 1/(T − 1) can be
covered. Note that therefore only the solid parts of the functions depicted are the relevant
parts. In Figure 2, all types [0, ρ] can be covered by an individual loan - the relevant parts
of both r(ρ) and r˜(ρ) are above 1/(T − 1). In Figure 3, some types without social capital
cannot be covered.
Note also that if we choose a much smaller T, 1/(T − 1) would rise above even r(ρ),
so that individual loans cannot be offered. As noted above (in section 6) for very short-
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duration loans, individual liability does not work since it is impossible for the savings
program to accumulate enough to deter deviation.
Finally, note that in the case of types covered by social insurance, r(ρ) is increasing in
ρ (Lemma 4) and therefore, if a loan program is incentive compatible for a type ρ, it is
also incentive compatible for all higher types. However, in the case of types excluded
from social insurance, r˜(ρ) is non-monotonic in ρ and therefore it is possible that a loan
program is incentive compatible for some types but not higher types. Figure 3 shows
such an example.
3.0
0.1
0.3 (for types with social capital)
(for types 
without so
cial capita
l)
1
T-1
___
0.6
ρ
min ρ
=
1
14
__
r (ρ)
 
r (ρ)~
0
Figure 2: The figure is drawn for parameter values M = 3, R = 0.3, T = 15, and p = 0.5, δ = 0.85.
Note that both r(ρ) and r˜(ρ) (the solid parts are the relevant parts) exceed 1/(T − 1). Therefore
all types–those with social capital and those without–are covered by the individual loan program.
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Figure 3: The only change from above is that now M = 2. All types with social capital are still
covered by the individual loan program, while out of the types without social capital (types in the
interval (0, 0.6)) only types (0, 0.125) are covered.
6 Comparing Social and Individual Incentives
The analysis above shows that individual liability loans can cover all types including
those who do not participate in social risk sharing, and these loans have the desirable
property that coverage is increasing in both duration T and loan size M. Therefore offer-
ing longer-duration loans or larger loans present no loss of coverage.
These properties contrast with the coverage under loans with repayment enforced through
social penalties. Such loans cannot cover types who do not participate in social risk shar-
ing, and do not even cover all types who do participate in social risk sharing. The cov-
erage for these loans is decreasing in duration, making long-duration loans problematic.
Further, the impact of loan size on coverage is ambiguous in general, while for long-
duration loans, loan coverage decreases in loan size.
The only clear advantage of loans based on social penalties arises for loans of very short
duration. For very small values of T, individual loans do not work: neither the incentive
compatibility condition in corollary 1 (for types with social capital) nor the condition
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(14) (for types without social capital) can be satisfied. Basically, for very short-duration
loans, individual liability does not work since it is impossible for the savings program to
accumulate enough to deter deviation. Loans based on social penalty have exactly the
opposite property: since the punishment can last even after the loan program is over,
shorter duration reduces deviation payoff without limiting the punishment - so social
penalties are very effective when the duration is very short.
7 Conclusion
Pioneered by the Grameen Bank, joint liability loans have generated much academic in-
terest. However, since 2002, the Grameen Bank offers purely individual liability loans.
Other well known micro finance institutions such as Bolivia’s BancoSol have similarly
moved from group loans to individual loans across several loan categories.
In this paper we compare the properties of loans based on social sanctions and individ-
ual liability loans for enforcing repayment. In discussing enforcement properties of such
loans, the literature typically assumes that a defaulter can be punished by others using ex-
ogenously available social sanctions. However, social penalties typically arise from long
term social interactions. We show that once we include such interactions in the model,
the conclusions about the power of such sanctions can be quite different. Basically, social
cooperation itself is sustained in equilibrium by ensuring that the benefit from cooper-
ation exceeds the one-shot deviation payoff plus the post-deviation punishment payoff
in future. Adding a loan program that relies on social penalties to engender repayment
adds to the one-shot deviation payoff of an agent (who can now deviate from both the
loan program and the underlying social cooperation game) but the post-deviation pun-
ishment payoff is still that in the underlying game. Thus adding a loan program dilutes
the power of social penalties. In our complete information set-up, agents who would po-
tentially deviate after getting a loan are simply excluded from the loan program. Thus
deviation does not occur in equilibrium, and the only issue is the coverage of the loan
program.
We show that a simple scheme of individual loans augmented by a compulsory illiquid
savings provision (such schemes are used by the Grameen Bank) has several advantages
over loans based on social penalties. First, such individual loans can cover a much greater
proportion of types - and could even cover types who do not participate in social risk
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sharing (i.e. types for which social penalties are not available at all). Second, while the
coverage of a loan program based on social sanctions decreases with the duration of the
loan program, the coverage under an incentive compatible individual loan program in-
creases with duration. Thus individual loan programs are much better suited for longer
lasting projects. Third, under individual loans, the coverage is also unambiguously in-
creasing in loan size, while under social sanctions the coverage in general changes in an
ambiguous manner as loan size changes. An exception is the special case of long-duration
loans, in which case the coverage is decreasing in loan size.
Further, interestingly, incentive compatible individual loans fit quite well with social co-
operation. Such loans do not alter the incentive of agents to cooperate socially. More
importantly, social cooperation helps raise the coverage of individual liability loans be-
cause the deviation gain is lower for an agent who participates in social risk-sharing.
Thus social capital has very different roles to play under social sanction based loans and
individual liability loans. Making use of social capital as a punishment mechanism can
exclude a significant fraction of types from the coverage of a loan program. However,
when not used as a penalty to enforce repayment, the same social capital can work as
a positive factor in the background that helps raise the coverage of an individual loan
program.
In essence, our results show that other than loans of a very short duration, individual lia-
bility loans can better deter strategic default compared to loans based on social sanction.
In particular, micro-credit programs often advance loans of small size and long dura-
tion. Individual liability loans with appropriate savings requirements would have larger
coverage for such loans compared to a loan program that relies on social penalties for en-
forcing repayment. This provides an explanation for the above mentioned move towards
individual liability in leading micro-credit programs.
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Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Let us first note a case of Jensen’s inequality that is used in this and a few other proofs. Let
f (x) = e ρx. Since f (·) is convex in x, Jensen’s inequality implies p f (1) + (1− p) f (0) >
f (p). This implies the following:
(A.1) pe ρ + (1− p)− epρ > 0. (Jensen’s Inequality)
From equation (2), the value of ρmin is given by
L
G
=
1− δ
δ
. Now,
L
G
=
(1− p)e (1+p)ρ + pepρ − e ρ
e ρ − epρ
.
Therefore
∂L/G
∂ρ
=
(1− p)e (1+p)ρ((1− p) + pe ρ − epρ)
(e ρ − epρ)2
> 0,
where the last inequality follows from (A.1). Finally, it is easy to check that L/G goes to
0 as ρ → 0,(10) and increases without bound as ρ increases. Therefore ρmin is positive and
unique, and L T G according as ρ T ρmin.
Finally, note that L/G is independent of δ, but the right hand side of the equation for ρmin
(given by
L
G
=
1− δ
δ
) decreases in δ. Since L/G is increasing in ρ, it is immediate that
ρmin is decreasing in δ. This completes the proof.‖
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Using the value of TLt(M ; ρ) from equation (5),
TL t(M ; ρ)− TL t−1(M ; ρ) =
δ
1− δ
(
(δT−t+1− δT−t)L(M ; ρ) +
(
δT−t − δT−t+1
)
L(0 ; ρ)
)
= δT−t+1 (L(0 ; ρ)−L(M ; ρ)) .(A.2)
First, L(0 ; ρ) = u(p ; ρ) − (pu(1 ; ρ) + (1− p)u(0 ; ρ)) > 0 (since u(· ; ρ) is concave, the
inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality).
(10)As ρ → 0, the derivative of the numerator with respect to ρ goes to 0, while that of the denominator
goes to (1− p). Using L’Hospital’s rule, the result is immediate.
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Now if L(M ; ρ) 6 0, the right hand side of equation (A.2) is strictly positive, and the
proof is complete. Next, suppose L(M ; ρ) > 0. Using the expression for u(· ; ρ) from
equation (1), and differentiating with respect to M,
LM(M ; ρ) = R e
−(p+MR)ρ − (1+ R)
(
p e−(1+M+MR)ρ + (1− p) e−(M+MR)ρ
)
= −e−(1+M+MR)ρ ((1− p) e ρ + p)
+ R
(
e−(p+MR)ρ − p e−(1+M+MR)ρ − (1− p) e−(M+MR)ρ
)
.
Note that the coefficient of R in the second term on the right hand side is exactly ρ L(M ; ρ).
Therefore,
LM(M ; ρ) = −e
−(1+M+MR)ρ ((1− p) e ρ + p)− ρ RL(M ; ρ).
Since L(M ; ρ) > 0, LM(M ; ρ) < 0. Therefore L(0 ; ρ)−L(M ; ρ) > 0. Therefore, the right
hand side of equation (A.2) is again strictly positive. This completes the proof.‖
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Let rG(M ; ρ) ≡
G(M ; ρ)
u(p ; ρ)
and rL(0 ; ρ) ≡
L(0 ; ρ)
u(p ; ρ)
. Clearly,
L(0 ; ρ)
G(M ; ρ)
=
rL(0 ; ρ)
rG(M ; ρ)
. We now
show that rG(M ; ρ) is strictly decreasing in ρ and rL(0 ; ρ) is strictly increasing in ρ.
Consider the derivatives of rL(0 ; ρ) and rG(M ; ρ) with respect to ρ.
∂rL(0 ; ρ)
∂ρ
=
(
δ
1− δ
)(
pe (p−1)ρ
(epρ − 1)2
)
(pe ρ + (1− p)− epρ) .
The first two terms are obviously strictly positive. The last term is positive from inequal-
ity (A.1). Therefore
∂rL(0 ;ρ)
∂ρ > 0. The proof now proceeds through the following Lemma.
Lemma 7.
∂rG(M ;ρ)
∂ρ < 0 for any M > 0 and R > 0.
Proof:
∂rG(M ; ρ)
∂ρ
= −
e−(1+M+LR)ρ
(epρ − 1)2
Z(M, ρ), where
Z(M, ρ) = −MRe (M+1)ρ − (1+M+ LR)e 2pρ +(p+MR)e (1+p+M)ρ +((1−p)+M+ LR)e pρ.
It follows that if we can show Z(M, ρ) > 0 for any M > 0 and any R > 0, that would
establish the result.
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First, fix any R > 0.
Next, note that Z(0, ρ) = epρ(−epρ + pe ρ + (1− p)) > 0, where the inequality follows
from inequality (A.1).
Next, consider the derivative of Z with respect to M, denoted ZM(M, ρ).
ZM(M, ρ) = R(ρM + 1)(e
pρ − 1)e (1+M)ρ + pρe (1+M+p)ρ − (R+ 1)epρ(epρ − 1).
Claim: Given any R > 0, ZM(M, ρ) > 0 for any M > 0 and any ρ > 0.
Proof of Claim: M enters the first two terms of ZM which are both positive and strictly
increasing in M. Therefore the derivative of ZM with respect to M is strictly positive, i.e.
ZMM(M, ρ) > 0. Now, if we can show that ZM is positive at M = 0, the proof would be
complete.
ZM(0, ρ) = R(e
pρ − 1)e ρ + pρe (1+p)ρ − (R+ 1)epρ(epρ − 1).
Consider the value of ZM(0, ρ) at ρ = 0. Clearly, ZM(0, 0) = 0. Also, the derivative of
ZM(0, ρ) with respect to ρ is given by
ZMρ(0, ρ) = (e
ρ − epρ) (epρ − 1) R+ epρ (pρe ρ − epρ + 1) .
The first term is obviously positive. In the second term, the coefficient of epρ is Y(ρ) ≡
pρe ρ − epρ + 1. This is 0 at ρ = 0, and Y′(ρ) = p(e ρ + ρe ρ − epρ) > 0 for any p ∈ [0, 1].
Therefore Y(ρ) > 0 for ρ > 0. It follows that ZMρ(0, ρ) > 0 for ρ > 0. Coupled with the
fact that ZM(0, 0) = 0, this implies that ZM(0, ρ) > 0 for any ρ > 0. In turn, this, coupled
with the fact that ZMM(M, ρ) > 0, implies that ZM(M, ρ) > 0 for any M > 0 and any
ρ > 0. This completes the proof of the claim.
To continue with the proof of Lemma 7, we now know that given any R > 0, the function
Z is positive at M = 0 and strictly increasing in M. It follows that Z(M, ρ) > 0 for all
strictly positive values of M and ρ. Note also that beyond assuming R > 0, we have not
restricted the value of R any further. This completes the proof of Lemma 7.‖
To continue with the proof of Lemma 2, we have now established that rG(M ; ρ) is strictly
decreasing in ρ and rL(0 ; ρ) is strictly increasing in ρ. Therefore the stated ratio is strictly
increasing in ρ.‖
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A.4 Proof of Lemma 3
Step 1 Using the form of the utility function (from equation (1)),
(A.3)
L(M ; ρ)
G(M ; ρ)
= (1− p)
(e ρ − 1)
e (1−p+M)ρ − 1
− 1.
ρ appears only in the coefficient of (1− p), which is of the form
e aρ − 1
e bρ − 1
where a, b are
positive real numbers with b R a according as M R p. The following Lemma establishes
some useful properties of such a ratio.
Lemma 8. Let Z1(x) ≡ e
xρ − 1. Let a, b be positive real numbers. Then
∂
∂ρ
(
Z1(a)
Z1(b)
)
⋚ 0 as
b R a. Further, if b > a, ∂
2
∂ρ2
(
Z1(a)
Z1(b)
)
> 0.
Proof: Let Z2(x) ≡
xe xρ
e xρ − 1
and Z3(x) ≡
x2e xρ
(e xρ − 1)2
. Then
∂
∂ρ
(
Z1(a)
Z1(b)
)
=
Z1(a)
Z1(b)
(
Z2(a)− Z2(b)
)
,(A.4)
∂2
∂ρ2
(
Z1(a)
Z1(b)
)
=
Z1(a)
Z1(b)
(
Z2(a)− Z2(b)
)2
+
Z1(a)
Z1(b)
(
Z3(b)− Z3(a)
)
.(A.5)
Now,
∂
∂x
Z2(x) =
e xρ
(e xρ − 1)2
(
e xρ − (1+ xρ)
)
> 0,
and
∂
∂x
Z3(x) =
xe xρ
(e xρ − 1)2
(
xρ + 2
(
1−
xρ
e xρ − 1
))
> 0,
where both inequalities follow from the fact that e xρ > 1+ xρ. Therefore Z2(a)− Z2(b) ⋚
0 as b R a and for b > a, and Z3(b)− Z3(a) > 0. This completes the proof of Lemma 8.‖
We now continue with the proof of Lemma 3. The result above shows that for M < p,
the ratio L(M ; ρ)/G(M ; ρ) increases in ρ. Further, for b < a, limρ→∞
Z1(a)
Z1(b)
= ∞, which
implies that for M < p, the ratio increases without bound as ρ increases.
For M > p, the result shows that L(M ; ρ)/G(M ; ρ) decreases in ρ , and the derivative
with respect to ρ is increasing - i.e. the derivative becomes less negative as ρ increases.
31
Further, for b > a, limρ→∞
Z1(a)
Z1(b)
= 0. It follows that ∂∂ρ
(
Z1(a)
Z1(b)
)
→ 0 as ρ increases. There-
fore for M > p, the derivative of L(M ; ρ)/G(M ; ρ) with respect to ρ falls to zero as ρ
increases.
Step 2 First, consider the case M > p. The left hand side of equation (6) is δ1−δ times
a convex combination of the two ratios L(0 ; ρ)/G(M ; ρ) and L(M ; ρ)/G(M ; ρ). From
Lemma 2,L(0 ; ρ)/G(M ; ρ) is increasing in ρ. Further, from step 1, forM < p, L(M ; ρ)/G(M ; ρ)
is increasing in ρ and for M = p, L(M ; ρ)/G(M ; ρ) is a constant function of ρ. Therefore
for M 6 p, the left hand side increases in ρ.
Now, as ρ → 0,
L(M ;ρ)
G(M ;ρ)
→ −M1−p+M < 0, and
L(0 ;ρ)
G(M ;ρ)
→ 0. Therefore, for ρ close to 0, the left
hand side of equation (6) is below 1. Further, the left hand side is continuous in ρ and, as
shown in step 1, rises without bound as ρ increases. Therefore there is a unique ρ̂t that
solves equation (6).
Step 3 Next, consider the case M > p. As ρ increases, L(0 ; ρ)/G(M ; ρ) increases with-
out bound as before, and L(M ; ρ)/G(M ; ρ) is negative, decreases at a decreasing rate,
and is bounded below by − 1. Further, the derivative of this ratio is the most negative at
ρ = 0 at which point is equals − 12
(M−p)(1−p)
M−p+1 > −
1
2 . Therefore the left hand side of equa-
tion (6), if it decreases at all, is decreasing for values of ρ close to zero, but there exists
ρ∗ > 0 such that the left hand side of equation (6) is increasing in ρ for ρ > ρ∗. Since the
left hand side is negative at ρ = 0, it is also negative at ρ = ρ∗. By the same argument as
in step 2, it follows that there is a unique ρ̂t > ρ∗ that solves equation (6).
Step 4 Finally, let us prove the second part of the Lemma. From the above we know
that the left hand side of equation (6) rises from below 1. It then follows that G(M ; ρ) ≷
TL t(M ; ρ) according as ρ ≷ ρ̂t which in turn implies Vt(T ; ρ) ≷ VDt (T ; ρ) according as
ρ ≷ ρ̂t.‖
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
For ease of exposition, let us change the notation slightly and write the total program
duration as an explicit argument of total loss - i.e. the total loss starting period t associated
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with a loan program of duration T is now written as TL t(T,M ; ρ). Further, let ρ̂t(T)
denote the solution to equation 6 given duration T.
From Lemma 1, we know that given any program of duration T, and any t 6 T,
TL t(T,M ; ρ) > TL t−1(T,M ; ρ).
Further, it is clear that TL t(T,M ; ρ) = TL t+1(T + 1,M ; ρ). Therefore
TL 1(T,M ; ρ) = TL 2(T + 1,M ; ρ) > TL 1(T + 1,M ; ρ).
From Lemma 3, TL 1(T,M ; ρ) = G(M) at ρ = ρ̂1(T). It follows from above that at
ρ = ρ̂1(T), TL 1(T + 1,M ; ρ) < G(M). Now, the proof of Lemma 3 shows that for any
given T, TL 1(T,M ; ρ) ⋚ G(M) as ρ ⋚ ρ̂1(T). It follows that ρ̂1(T + 1) > ρ̂1(T). Finally,
using Proposition 2, this implies that ρ∗(T + 1) > ρ∗(T).‖
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
In what follows, for economy of notation, we drop the argument and write ρ∗(T) simply
as ρ∗.
Let β denote the left hand side of equation (6).
1. As shown in the proof of Lemma 3, β is increasing in ρ at the solution ρ̂t, and therefore
at ρ∗ (which is ρ̂t at t = 1). Let βx denote the partial derivative of β with respect to x. The
derivative of ρ∗ with respect to M is simply (−βM/βρ) evaluated at ρ
∗. Therefore if we
can show that β is decreasing in M, this will establish that ρ∗ is increasing in M.
2. The derivative of β (which is the left hand side of equation (6)) with respect to M is
given by
∂β
∂M
=
δ
1− δ
[
(1− δT−t)
∂
∂M
(
L(M ; ρ)
G(M ; ρ)
)
+ δT−t
∂
∂M
(
L(0 ; ρ)
G(M ; ρ)
)]
.
3.
L(M ;ρ)
G(M ;ρ)
is given by equation (A.3), from which it is clear that the ratio is decreasing in
M.
4. Now consider the ratio
L(0 ;ρ)
G(M ;ρ)
. Here only the denominator depends on M. Now,
(A.6)
∂
∂M
G(M ; ρ) = e−MRρ
(
(1+ R)e−(1+M)ρ − Re−pρ
)
.
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Given finite R, the expression above is bounded below.(11) The expressions L(0 ; ρ) and
G(M ; ρ) are positive and bounded above. Therefore ∂∂M
(
L(0 ;ρ)
G(M ;ρ)
)
is bounded above.
5. Note that the expression for
∂β
∂M is a constant times the weighted sum of two partial
derivative terms. Since δ < 1, as T rises, the weight attached to the first of the two
partial derivative terms rises to 1, and the weight attached to the second of the two partial
derivative terms falls to 0. Then 3 and 4 above imply that for T large enough,
∂β
∂M < 0.
From 1, this implies that ρ∗ increases in M, implying that coverage is decreasing in M.‖
A.7 Proof of Lemma 4
Let M(1+ R)ρ ≡ A. Then r(ρ) can be written as φ(A), where
φ(A) = (1+ R)
ln[1− δ + δe A]
A
− 1.
Note that
(A.7) sign
∂φ(A)
∂A
= sign
∂r(ρ)
∂ρ
.
Now,
∂φ(A)
∂A =
1+R
A2B
H(A), where H(A) ≡ A(B− (1− δ))− B ln[B] and B ≡ 1− δ +
δe A. Thus sign
∂φ(A)
∂A = sign
∂H(A)
∂A . At A = 0, we have B = 1. Therefore H(0) = 0. Next,
∂H(A)
∂A = B− (1− δ) + (A− ln[B]− 1)
dB
dA . Using
dB
dA = δe
A and simplifying,
∂H(A)
∂A
= δe A(A− ln[B]) > 0.
Since H(0) = 0 and ∂H(A)∂A > 0, it follows that H(A) > 0 for A > 0. Thus
∂φ(A)
∂A > 0 for
A > 0. But A > 0 for ρ > 0. Using equation (A.7), this implies that
∂r(ρ)
∂ρ > 0 for ρ > 0.‖
A.8 Proof of Proposition 8
Define the following functions:
Ĝ(X ; ρ) ≡ u(1+ X ; ρ)− u(p+ X ; ρ),
L̂(X ; ρ) ≡ u(p+ X ; ρ)−
(
pu(1+ X ; ρ) + (1− p)u(X ; ρ)
)
.
(11)This can be verified easily by minimizing with respect to M. The minimized value is negative and
finite.
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Suppose a type participating in social insurance who receives and repays an individual
loan contemplates deviation from social insurance in any period t 6 T. The immediate
gain is Ĝ(M(R− r) ; ρ) and the total future loss is given by
T̂L t(M ; ρ) =
T−t−1∑
k=1
δkL̂(M(R− r) ; ρ) + δT−tL̂(M(1+ R) ; ρ) +
δT−t+1
1− δ
L̂(0 ; ρ).
Now, types ρ > ρmin participate in social insurance where ρmin is given by equation (2).
Using current notation, this can be rewritten as
(A.8) Ĝ(0 ; ρmin) =
δ
1− δ
L̂(0 ; ρmin).
If we can show that Ĝ(M(R − r) ; ρmin) 6 T̂L t(M ; ρmin), that would imply that none
of the types who participate in social insurance have an incentive to deviate from social
insurance when the loan is introduced. Now,
T̂L t(M ; ρmin)
Ĝ(M(R− r) ; ρmin)
= δ
(
1− δT−t−1
1− δ
)
L̂(M(R − r) ; ρmin)
Ĝ(M(R− r) ; ρmin)
+ δT−t
L̂(M(1+ R) ; ρmin)
Ĝ(M(R− r) ; ρmin)
+
δT−t+1
1− δ
L̂(0 ; ρmin)
Ĝ(M(R− r) ; ρmin)
.
Using the form of the utility function from equation (1), it can be easily verified that the
following equalities hold:
L̂(M(R− r) ; ρ)
Ĝ(M(R− r) ; ρ)
=
L̂(0 ; ρ)
Ĝ(0 ; ρ)
,
L̂(M(1+ R) ; ρ)
Ĝ(M(R − r) ; ρ)
= e −M(1+r)ρ
L̂(0 ; ρ)
Ĝ(0 ; ρ)
,
L̂(0 ; ρ)
Ĝ(M(R− r) ; ρ)
= e M(R−r)ρ
L̂(0 ; ρ)
Ĝ(0 ; ρ)
.
Using these, and using equation (A.8),
T̂L t(M ; ρmin)
Ĝ(M(R − r) ; ρmin)
=
1− δ
δ
(
δ
(
1− δT−t−1
1− δ
)
+ δT−te −M(1+r)ρ +
δT−t+1
1− δ
e M(R−r)ρ
)
= 1+ δT−t−1e −M(1+r)ρ
(
1− δ + δe M(1+R)ρ − e M(1+r)ρ
)
.
Therefore
T̂L t(M ; ρmin)
Ĝ(M(R− r) ; ρmin)
> 1 if and only if 1− δ + δe M(1+R)ρ − e M(1+r)ρ > 0, which
is the same condition as (10), which implies the rest. This completes the proof.‖
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A.9 Proof of Proposition 9
Step 1: Loss and gain from deviation In each period an agent is supposed to repay the
loan amount M and make a deposit of rM. Therefore the income gain from deviating in
any period t 6 T is M(1+ r). The gain in utility is therefore ∆u ≡ u(I +M(1+ r))− u(I)
where I = L(R − r) in the low income state and I = 1+ L(R − r) in the high income
state. Since u(·) is concave, ∆u decreases in I: the same income gain leads to a higher
utility gain in the low income state. It follows that the deviation gain is highest in the low
income state. If the incentive to repay holds in this state, it also holds in the other (high
income state).
Therefore the immediate gain from deviation we must consider is
G˜ = u(L(1+ R) ; ρ)− u(L(R − r) ; ρ).
Next, consider the loss from such deviation in future periods. If the deviation takes place
in period t < T, then the agent does not get any further loans or lump sum payoffs.
Therefore, at each of the next T − t− 1 periods (i.e. for periods t+ 1 until period T − 1)
he loses M(R− r)which is the amount he would have earned by conforming. Finally, the
loss in period T is the final period payoff from conforming, given by M(1+ R).
Let
L˜(X) ≡ p(u(1+ X ; ρ)− u(1 ; ρ)) + (1− p)(u(X ; ρ)− u(0 ; ρ)).
As noted above, after deviation at t, the loss lasts for T − t periods and the total loss is
given by
T˜Lt = δ
1− δT−t−1
1− δ
L˜(M(R− r)) + δT−tL˜(M(1+ R)).
As before, no deviation in the last period requires (T − 1)Mr > M, implying that for any
given r, we must have r > 1/(T − 1).
Step 2: Necessity Consider the incentive to deviate at period T− 1 when there is only 1
period left. Clearly, a necessary condition for a loan to be incentive compatible is that the
agent does not deviate at T − 1. This condition is:
T˜LT−1 > G˜.
Using the form of the utility function, this is exactly the condition (13). This proves the
necessity of condition (13).
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Step 3: Sufficiency Next, we prove sufficiency.
T˜Lt−1− T˜Lt =
δT−t e−(1+M+MR)ρ
(1− p)e ρ + p
ρ
1− δ + δe M(1+R)ρ − e M(1+r)ρ.
Note that the above is positive if the term in the parenthesis at the end is positive. But
this is the same as condition (10). From lemma 5, this condition holds automatically
when condition (13) holds. Therefore if condition (13) holds, the total loss is increasing
for earlier deviations. Therefore if incentive compatibility holds for deviation at T − 1,
it also holds for all earlier deviations. This proves that condition (13) is sufficient for the
individual loan program to be incentive compatible. This completes the proof.‖
A.10 Proof of Lemma 6
Let ψ(M) ≡ (1− p)δe (1+M(1+R))ρ +
(
1− (1− p)δ
)
e ρ + pδ
(
e M(1+R)ρ − 1
)
. Note that
ψ′(M) = δ ρ (1+ R) e M(1+R)ρ(p+ (1− p)e ρ) > 0 and ψ′′(M) = ρ (1+ R)ψ′(M).
Now, r˜(ρ) =
ln[ψ(M)]
M ρ
−
M+ 1
M
. Therefore
∂r˜(ρ)
∂M
=
1
M2
ξ(M), where
ξ(M) = 1+
M
ρ
ψ′(M)
ψ(M)
−
ln[ψ(M)]
ρ
.
Clearly, sign
∂r˜(ρ)
∂M
= sign ξ(M).
Now, it can be checked easily that ξ(0) = 0. Further,
ξ
′(M) =
M
ρ ψ(M)2
(
ψ′′(M)ψ(M) − (ψ′(M))2
)
=
M ψ′(M)
ρ ψ(M)2
(
ρ (1+ R)ψ(M) − ψ′(M)
)
=
M ψ′(M)
ρ ψ(M)2
ρ (1+ R)
(
(1− δ)e ρ + p δ(e ρ − 1)
)
> 0.
Since ξ(0) = 0 and ξ′(·) > 0, it follows that ξ(M) > 0 for any M > 0. Therefore
∂r˜(ρ)
∂M
> 0.‖
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